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LETFING THE FREE MARKET DISTRIBUTE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
KYLE C. JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUCTION

Without question environmental protection has moved to the
forefront of public discourse. Environmentalists complain that the
government has failed to protect the environment from corporate
polluters.'
Business interests, in turn, complain that environmental
protection schemes bury corporate America under a sea of inefficient
government regulation.2
Of course, both sides are correct to some degree. During the
industrial revolution the government actively subsidized the exploitation
of natural resources and refused to recognize the legitimate rights of
individual property owners faced with an encroaching corporate polluter.3
In the last two decades, however, the government has adopted several

B.A. University of Pennsylvania, 1990; M.A. in International Affairs, University
of
Chicago, 1991; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary,
expected 1994.
1. See, e.g., Margaret E. Kriz, Shades of Green, NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 28, 1990, at
1826 (discussing how militant grassroots groups within the environmental movement are
leading the push for greater governmental controls on American corporations).
2. See, e.g., John Shanahan, Market Powerand the Environment, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan.
22, 1992, at 13. Shanahan, an environmental policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation,
estimates that "heavy-handed regulatory initiatives" cost the United States $115 billion in
1991 alone. But see John Elkington, Industry, From Being the Villain of the Piece,
Becomes a Natural Partner, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 18, 1988, at VII (highlighting
industry's response to environmental risks).
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886). Sanderson
involved the claim of a riparian landowner who brought a nuisance action against
Pennsylvania Coal Company. Sanderson claimed that she was damaged by pollution
discharged into a small tributary to the Lackawnna River that passed through her property.
The court ruled in favor of Pennsylvania Coal Company:
[tihe plaintiffs grievance is for a more personal inconvenience; and we
are of opinion that mere private personal inconveniences, arising in this
way and under such circumstances, must yield to the necessities of a
great public industry, which, although in the hands of a private
corporation, subserves a great public interest.
Id. at 459.
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sweeping laws to combat pollution and preserve natural resources.4
This Article examines the practical effects of the current scheme of
seeking environmental protection through government regulation. The
author argues that problems presented in the current regulatory model are
problems inherent in most of government's attempts to concoct a political
solution to an economic problem. Instead of adopting stringent or
absolutist environmental policies for their own sake, this Article asserts
that the government should focus on forcing polluters to compensate
pollution victims for the property or health damage which results from
such pollution.
The first section of the Article describes the evolution of
environmental legislation and the philosophy underlying the modem
approach to environmental protection. The second section demonstrates
that the government could pursue a more fair and equitable environmental
policy by introducing free market principles into the current scheme. The
next section offers a case study in how the government could modify a
currently oppressive environmental law, the oil sheen test of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.'
II. THE EVOLUTION AND PHILOSOPHY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION

A. The Rise of Regulation
Prior to the enactment of today's environmental regulations, private
landowners primarily relied on the common law tort of nuisance to protect
their property from the encroachments of others.6 At common law a

4. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988))
(regulating the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, and of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)) (regulating the emission of
airborne pollutants); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 92580, 86 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)).
5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 311(b), Pub. L. No. 92500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988)).
6. Robert J. Smith, Privatizing the Environment, 20 PoLIcy REVIEW 11, 13 (1982).

Smith argues that the government moved from a free market economic system, which
favored private property, to a system more akin to "state capitalism" or "corporate
statism," which allowed certain businesses to invade and destroy the property rights of
others. See generally, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
1780-1860 (1977).
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landowner brought an action for private nuisance if he suffered a specific
harm from another individual.7 Eventually, the common law also
recognized the landowner's right to sue for damages in cases of public
nuisance when the landowner was affected directly.'
The common law protection of individual property rights served the
interest of property owners so long as the courts were willing to recognize
the value of those rights. At least a few courts chose to ignore the rights
of private landowners during the industrial revolution because recognizing
those fights might have impeded development efforts. 9 Over the years,
the courts generally have required that public polluters desist all noxious
activity or compensate the victims if they continue operation. 10
Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government began to replace
common law schemes with an assortment of comprehensive environmental
regulations. Responding to the pervasive sentiment that the rise in
pollution posed serious risks to personal health and the overall quality of
life, the government tackled such issues as air" and water 2 pollution,
natural resource preservation," and endangered species protection. 4
Economic realities certainly factored into the scope of the legislation, but
the government clearly regarded pollution as a societal menace which
needed reduction. 5
B. Flawed Reasoning
The modern approach to pollution control is flawed because the
underlying reasoning is weak. The modern environmental attitude relies

7. See William A. McRae, Jr., The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law,
1 U. FLA. L. REV. 27, 30-31 (1948).

8. See id. at 36.
9. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886).
10. See, e.g., Boomer v. Ad. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, (N.Y. 1970).
11. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, and of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(1988)).
12. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)).

13. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 92-580, 86 Stat.
2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)).
14. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.).
15. See Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 19, 24-32 (1986) (discussing the moral basis of pollution control law).
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These include, but are not limited

1. Pollution is inherently harmful.
2. Negative externalities do not allow for market control.
3. The inability of humans to ascertain adequately the future value of
natural resources requires that we preserve existing resources.
4. Humans are unable to predict the future harmful effects of pollution.
5. Government regulation is necessary to avoid the "tragedy of the
17
commons."
6. Larger population leads to greater environmental depravation.
7. Capitalists would rather destroy the environment than preserve it.
8. Punitive regulations encourage businesses to replace environmentally
harmful technologies with environmentally benign technologies.
A brief look at each of these assumptions reveals that the modern
approach to pollution control is tragically flawed.
1. Pollution is inherently harmful.
Too often the quest for pollution control is couched in zero-sum
terms. 8 The implication is that every reduction in pollution serves to
enhance our quality of life and to further our ultimate goal of restoring the
earth to its pristine nature.
The fallacy in this reasoning lies in the notion that human
manipulation and pollution of the environment are unnatural. Humans
have every right to manipulate their environment to enhance their standard
of living, whether the manipulation entails stripmining or felling old

16. For a list of ten other questionable assumptions, see James L. Huffman, Protecting
the Environmentfrom Orthodox Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349,
361-369 (1992). See also Sagoff, supra note 15, at 29-32.
17. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).

Hardin

argues that every member of society has an incentive to exploit commonly owned
resources to the maximum extent possible. This might include grazing cattle on
community property or dumping pollutants into community waterways. Each rational
citizen realizes that any community resource which he neither consumes nor contaminates
may meet a similar fate at the hands of his neighbor. For this reason no community
member will seek to preserve the future viability of the resources.
18. See, e.g.,

DONELLA

H.

MEADOWS ET AL., BEYOND THE LIMrrs

(1992) (arguing that

if human activity continues at the present pace it will exceed the carrying capacity of the
biosphere and precipitate a collapse of the biosphere within the next few decades).
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growth forests. Ultimately, these policies may prove economically
inefficient, and thus impractical, but they are not morally bankrupt simply
because they constitute an attempt to use the environment in an
advantageous manner.
2. Negative externalitiespreclude market control.
The traditional rationale for governmentally engineered
environmental protection schemes is that polluters rarely bear the full cost
of their pollution. 9 This notion of negative externalities suggests that
government should regulate the quantity of pollution produced in order to
avoid the problem of under-compensation of parties adversely affected by
pollution. 20 Without question, this argument has some merit; historically,
many companies have escaped financial liability for the environmental
damage they have caused.2"
Negative externalities need not lead to expansive regulations,
however. Were the government to define and protect private property
rights more effectively, private property owners could seek compensation
directly from polluters.22 As discussed below, such an initiative would
19. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Fallaciesof Free Market Environmentalism, 15
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371, 375-376 (1992) ("The market does not ensure that

resource developers bear the full costs of air pollution, old growth forest liquidation, or
water diversions. Developers do not pay these 'external' costs, which means that the
marketplace overvalues polluting activities and resource consumption, producing economic
inefficiency.").
20. Addressing the issue of whether the free market allocation of resources promotes
liberty, Blumm argues:
The liberty of those who emit air pollutants, discharge water
contaminants, or dispose of hazardous waste materials may well be
increased. But those exposed to environmental degradation lose liberty.
And those numbers of liberty-losers typically outnumber considerably
the liberty-gainers. Whether aggregate liberty is gained from market
transactions is difficult to ascertain, but it is clear that some of the
liberty-losers pay enormous health costs.
Id. at 380.
21. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886).
22. See generally, TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). Describing their vision of a free market approach to
controlling the discharge of pollutants into waterways, Anderson and Leal write:
A truly free market approach to pollution control would require

84
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allow property owners a greater opportunity to determine the actual value

of the environmental resources which they control. Although government
regulation protects potential victims of negative externalities to some
extent, the same regulation creates externalities of its own. For example,
environmental regulation often redistributes wealth so as to concentrate the

benefits of environmental protection in certain interest groups, yet
distributes the costs among the population at large.23
3. Because humans are not able to ascertainadequately the future value
of natural resources, we should preserve existing resources.
Environmentalists assert that the environment offers untold
possibilities for technological gains, most notably in the field of
medicine. 2A Destruction or contamination of these resources, so the

polluters and recipients of the discharge to bargain over the level of
pollution. Bargaining may take place in the form of an exchange of
property rights, where the discharger pays the recipient for disposal
before the fact or in the form of payments for damages paid after the
fact. Either way, both parties have an incentive to consider the tradeoffs associated with more or less pollution. Of course, an exchange of
property rights or payments for damages both require well-defined and
enforced property rights. While many policy analysts have concluded
that [the logistical problems which large numbers of potential parties
pose] render the potential for well-defined and enforced property rights
impossible, we must remember that property rights evolve when
economic pressures increase the value of polluted resources or decrease
the costs of establishing property rights.
Id. at 147-48.
23. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 223, 230-33 (1986).
Professor Macey provides an excellent overview of the interest group theory of legislation.
He explains, "The major implications of interest group theory are that legislation transfers
wealth from society as a whole to those discrete, well-organized groups that enjoy
superior access to the political process, and that government will enact laws that reduce
societal wealth and economic efficiency in order to benefit these economic groups." Id.
at 230.
24. William K. Stevens, Humanity Confronts Its Handiwork, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1992,
at Cl. Stevens reports:
Apart from the value attached to life in general, natural ecosystems
provide the materials of human sustenance. That is where crops
originally came from. Forests contain untapped riches in the form of
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argument goes, effectuates a short-term gain at the expense of long-term
progress.25
This vision of "myopic consumption" fails to recognize that the
preservation of currently valuable resources may impose significant costs
on contemporary society. 26 If groups within society wish to preserve
certain resources, then they certainly should do so. The entire society,
however, should not have to bear the costs for such endeavors.
rather than the
Preservation through regulation requires society,
27
conservation.
resource
for
pay
to
preservationists,
4. Humans are unable to predict the future harmful effects of pollution.
Because the future effects of many environmental risks remain

unknown,' many environmentalists argue that the government should
actively regulate the introduction of pollutants into the environment. 29
Certainly, modem science is engaged in an ongoing process of ascertaining

medicines. But more than that, scientists say, natural ecosystems are
such an essential part of the biosphere that mass extinctions could
undermine its functioning.
Id.
25. Id.
26. See Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. Cfu. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982)
27. The Takings Clause of the Constitution prohibits the taking of private property for
a public purpose without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The government
may regulate the use of private property, however. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S.

365 (1926). Environmental regulations violate the takings clause if they deprive the
property owner of all economic use of the property. Lucas v. South Carolina, 112 S.Ct.
2886 (1992). Regulations which do not create a "regulatory taking" are constitutional.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Such regulations
obviously benefit the parties who request them (e.g., the preservationists) at the expense
of the property owners who would rather use the land for another purpose. The
preservationists benefit, but the property owners bear the costs. See generally RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
28. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 24. Stevens discusses the debate surrounding global
warming.
29. See, e.g., Larry B. Stammer, Global EnvironmentalThreat Largely Ignored, Experts
Say, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at 4.
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the actual risks posed by manufactured pollutants.3"
The government should not predicate pollution control on the
speculation of harmful effects. To do so would cripple the search for
valuable uses for our environmental resources. Technological innovation
requires that manufacturers take risks based on incomplete information.
Product manufacturers accept the risk that some of their new products will

prove harmful, subjecting themselves to strict liability for the harm which
they cause." To require that no product may be released into the stream
of commerce until all of its dangerous propensities are known and
understood would restrict commerce unreasonably. At some point, the cost
of paying for the potential harm of a new product is less than the cost of
32
additional prevention. At that point the product goes to the market.
Restricting the activities of potential polluters because their pollution may
pose a greater risk than is currently ascertainable imposes the same type
of efficiency losses on those polluters, and inflates the cost of polluters'

30. See, e.g., Martin Brown, Science, Technology & the Environment, OECD OBSERVER,
Feb. 1992, at 11 (discussing environmental research efforts in the member countries of
the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development).
31. For an example of the strict liability standard which governs products liability cases
see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
32. This is the point at which the marginal cost of an additional unit of prevention
exceeds the marginal benefit of that unit. For example, assume that every unit of
prevention (e.g., testing for defects) costs $100 and the benefits of prevention are subject
to a diminishing returns condition. The first unit of prevention achieves gains far in
excess of $100. The second unit of prevention also achieves gains in excess of $100, but
not as great as the first. At point x, the gains from prevention are equal to $100. The
cost of prevention also equals $100. The manufacturer will not purchase prevention
beyond point x because the cost of an additional unit outweighs the benefit.
Under a strict liability system, the benefit of prevention is a smaller payout of
compensatory damages. Since the manufacturer must compensate victims for all harm
which its defective products cause, the benefit from each unit of prevention is the amount
of decrease in the manufacturer's overall exposure. At point x, where the cost of an
additional unit of prevention exceeds the additional benefit of that unit, the manufacturer
will purchase no additional prevention and the product will go to market. See Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
L.. 1055 (1972).
If the government decided that every victim of a defective product should receive
double damages, the manufacturer would purchase considerably more prevention. The
benefits from each unit of prevention would double because the cost of compensation
would double. Of course, the manufacturer would be paying to prevent not only the harm
but also the penalty.
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products unnecessarily."
5. Government regulation is necessary to avoid the "tragedy of the
commons."
Government regulation is undoubtedly one method of avoiding the
35
tragedy of the commons,' but it is not necessarily the best method.
Regulation may skew economic incentives and redistribute wealth among
groups

within

society.36

Environmental

regulation geared toward

maintaining the free market resource distribution provides a more efficient
and equitable model to combat this "tragedy." The market requires parties
to actually pay for the resources that they receive. The tragedy of the
commons suggests that the best method to preserve community resources
is to restrict access to those resources. A free market approach to the
preservation of community resources requires that the government sell
rights to the property. The party who places the highest value on
community resources must compensate the other members of society for
exclusive access.
6. Largerpopulation leads to greater environmental depravation.
This assumption represents the least persuasive element of the
environmentalist agenda. Modern environmental alarmists currently raise
This
the specter of dire consequences such as "overpopulation.""

33. See supra note 32. The government might wish to protect environmental resources

on the basis that the cost to society of a polluter's activity may exceed the polluter's
benefit. The problem is essentially one of preserving the future value of those resources.
There is no reason to believe, however, that the government maintains future value any

better than the private sector. Quite the contrary, government control and regulation of
environmental resources should raise grave public concern. See Richard L. Stroup &
Sandra L. Goodman, Property Rights, Environmental Resources, and the Future, 15
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 427 (1992) (arguing that the private sector protects future value
much better than the government).
34. For example, the government may restrict access to community resources or require

that polluters either refrain from their activity or compensate the community at large.
35. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Versus Political
Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297 (1992) (arguing that private

enforcement of well-defined property rights offers a better solution to managing
environmental resources).
36. See Macey, supra note 23.
37. See, e.g., Susan Watts, Duke Says Smaller FamiliesNeeded to Save the World, THE
INDEPENDENT (London),

Oct. 22, 1991, at 7.
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discredited theory dates back to Malthus.38 Essentially, the argument fails
to account adequately for productivity increases and resource
The environmentalists fail to recognize that people
substitution.3 9
approach quality of life issues, including family size, from the same
rational economic perspective that informs their economic decisions.: °
People naturally link population size to environmental preference."
7. Capitalists would rather destroy the environment than preserve it.
Capitalists would rather make money than not. In order to
minimize the cost of producing her product, the capitalist will pass to other
parties all costs, including pollution costs, which such other parties will
accept.4 2 If capitalists are forced to bear the full cost of environmental
depravation, then the pollution calculus changes. Capitalists have an
economic incentive to reduce pollution when they must pay the actual cost

38. See ANDERSON AND LEAL, supra note 22, at 1-2.
39. Anderson and Leal describe the fallacy of the "Neo-Malthusians" as follows:
The problem rests in the acceptance of Malthus's initial premise that
demands on resources will be exponential while the supply is finite. All
of these forecasts [predicting overpopulation] fail to take account of the
ability of humans to react to problems of scarcity by reducing
consumption, finding substitutes, and improving productivity.
Id. at 2.
40. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 171-94
(1976) (arguing that family size is a rational economic decision).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, supra note 6. Smith places blame for pollution squarely
on the shoulders of government not the free market. Writes Smith:
The existence of pollution in a "free enterprise system," is not proof that
the market system is characterized by externalities and a condemnation
of the system; instead, it is proof that the system is not a private
property, free market system. Rather than being an example of market
failure, it is an example of governmental failure. It is the failure of the
government and the courts to protect the system of private property
rights upon which a private enterprise economy is founded.
Id. at 17.
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of pollution."
8. Punitive regulations encourage businesses to replace environmentally
harmful technologies with environmentally benign technologies.
Although this statement is true, it fails to recognize that many
regulations distort economic incentives to the detriment of consumers."
Behavior-forcing 4 regulations artificially raise the relative benefit of
using expensive environmentally benign technologies. 6 A truly free
market, one in which producers compensate society for the actual cost of

43.

Lax protection of property rights encourages polluters to invade private and

community property. The polluter has no incentive to invest in non-polluting alternatives
unless the law requires that she compensate society for the costs which her pollution
imposes upon others. In effect, lax protection of property rights subsidizes polluters and
penalizes property owners. When the government actively protects rights (i.e., removes

the subsidy for polluters) non-pollution alternatives become more appealing.
44. See e.g., ROBERT A. LEONE, WHO PROFITs?, 55-57 (1986) (describing how water
pollution regulation raises fixed costs of the paper industry). See also BECKER, supra note
40, at 194-196 (discussing how producers might deal with the "creeping incrementalism"
of EPA water pollution standards).
45. "Behavior-forcing" refers to regulations which mandate or preclude certain courses
of conduct on the part of polluters. For example, a law which requires coal-burning
utilities to install scrubbers, but does not allow the utility to attempt other methods of
reducing sulfur oxide emissions, forces a particular course of conduct. For a detailed look
at the scrubber issue, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND THE COAL
LOBBY (Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen eds., 1983).
46. In the same way that incentive obscuring regulations cause product manufacturers to
invest in excessive prevention, see supra note 30, environmental regulations obscure the
pollution/non-pollution calculus. For example, suppose a company can spend $100 to
avoid $150 worth of environmental damage. Assuming that it must pay the entire cost
of the environmental damage, the company will purchase the prevention and save fifty
dollars. Assuming that the diminishing returns condition applies, the cost of an additional
unit of prevention will exceed the cost of the environmental harm at some point. At that
point the company will prefer to pay for the damage rather than purchase more
prevention. If the law imposes pollution fines in excess of the actual environmental
damage, the company will purchase more prevention. For example, suppose the cost of
prevention equals the savings derived from that prevention at point x. That is, any
additional unit of prevention costs more than the cost of compensating the victims of
pollution. Now suppose the government passes a law which requires that companies
compensate victims of pollution at twice the cost of actual harm (e.g., $100 harm equals

$200 total payout). After the enactment of this law the company will purchase additional
prevention beyond point x. This is because, at point x, the cost of prevention is only half
of the total cost of compensation (i.e., actual harm multiplied by two). The law
effectively skews the company's cost-benefit analysis.

90

WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 17:79

pollution, serves as the best mechanism for determining society's valuation
of environmental protection.4 7
III. THE FREE MARKET APPROACH

Interested parties can determine the actual value of environmental
protection only if the environmental protection laws allow the free market
valuation of all resources. 4 ' Environmental legislation should encourage
the preservation of environmental resources only if free market participants
determine that the value of preservation or non-pollution exceeds the
pollution value49 of those resources. In other words, government should
allow market participants to determine the economically efficient level of
pollution.
A. Applying the Coase Theorem50 to EnvironmentalProtection

47. A return to the example in note 46 supra will illustrate that the penalizing legislation
overvalues society's resources. If the compensation law required double indemnification,
the company would purchase prevention beyond point x. Assuming that the property
owner makes no distinction between the value of the property and compensation, he
would accept compensation for the company's environmental damage so long as the
compensation equaled his valuation of his property rights. That is, the company will offer
to compensate rather than prevent beyond point x (because compensation is cheaper), and
the property owner will accept the compensation as full payment for his property rights.
Neither party is worse off, and one party, the company, is better off because it did not
have to purchase more prevention. Economists refer to cases in which gainers could
compensate losers such that no individual would be worse off and at least one person
would be better off as Kaldor-Hicks efficiencies. See Jules L. Coleman, Economics and
the Law, 94 ETHIcs 649,. 649-652 (1984). But see Richard Craswell, Efficiency and
RationalBargainingin ContractualSettings, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 805, 813-814
(1992) (questioning the usefulness of Kaldor-Hicks analysis when examining society-wide
regulations).
If the law requires double compensation, it skews the valuation of both the
property rights and the prevention. Since the benefits from prevention increase, the
company purchases more prevention and less compensation. The property owner's
position remains essentially the same, the only difference being that he retains his rights
instead of receiving compensation. The company is worse off because it must purchase
more prevention after the enactment of the law.
48. See, e.g., Anderson & Leal, supra note 35, at 303-309 (describing how the
assignment of property rights and liability rules allow free market participants to negotiate
values for environmental resources).
49. See supra note 46. The pollution value is the cost of compensation.
50. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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The Coase Theorem posits that when third party contract
enforcement is guaranteed and when transaction costs are zero, the
contracts of commercial transactors will assign efficient values to the
resources in question.51 The transactors will sell and purchase rights and
resources in an effort to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. 52 In the
bargaining process, one transactor offers a right which he owns, such as
a property right, to the other party for some value greater than the first
party could receive without the exchange. The second party will purchase
that right only if the exchange also leaves her more wealthy, according to
her definition of wealth.
In the environmental realm, transactors can exchange property
rights for more valuable resources. For example, upon realizing that his
land is more valuable to a train company than to himself, a farmer will
transfer his property rights to the company rather than continue to farm.
The Coase Theorem places no pre-set values on environmental resources.
A different farmer may demand a price greater than its value to the train
company. In that case, no exchange will occur.
Conceptually, the leap to private pollution control and natural
resource conservation requires little additional effort.
If the
aforementioned train company desired the right to pollute the farmer's
property, but not to own the property itself, the farmer would still demand
a price greater than the property's current value as a farm. The two
rational actors would decide among themselves whether polluting the farm
was economically efficient.
The same logic applies to natural resource conservation. If market
participants are required to compensate resource owners at the free market
value of those resources, both parties become more wealthy. For example,
if an environmental preservation group realizes that the public is willing
to pay to visit a forest currently owned by a logging company, the group
can purchase the forest, mortgage it, and pay the mortgage with revenue
generated from charging admission to the forest. Following the Coase
Theorem, if the preservation value is greater than the logging value, then
the environmental group will purchase the property, or perhaps only the
use rights to the property, from the logging company. All parties involved
benefit. The logging company receives more money than it could have
produced otherwise, and the environmental group preserves the forest.

51. Id.
at 1-8.
52. Id.
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B. The Transaction Cost "Problem"
The Coase Theorem assumes that transaction costs 53 are zero, but,

in reality, all exchanges involve such costs.The high cost of
information accumulation serves as a potential pitfall in the Coase calculus.
Specifically, the cost of ascertaining the value of a resource alters the
valuation of that resource.
Traditionally, the government has sought to minimize
environmental transaction costs through regulation.55 Most breaches of
property rights result in rather insignificant environmental damage. In
situations where numerous property owners suffer minimal property
damage at the hands of an encroaching party, the government finds ample
56
justification for comprehensive environmental regulations.
For example, the government protects riparian landowners by
limiting the discharge of pollutants into navigable waterways.' The high
transaction costs of ascertaining the exact harm associated with the water
pollution require that the government seek to limit the quantity of
pollutants introduced.
According to the transaction cost analysis,
government regulation replaces a prohibitive cost - individual information
accumulation and rights enforcement, with an inexpensive alternative government-enforced quantity control.
Efficiency gains from regulatory schemes may be illusory, however.
The regulatory model provides a prime opportunity for "rent-seeking"
behavior on the part of interested groups. 58 The lobbying process can

53. Transaction costs are the costs associated with the exchange of rights. These may
include information accumulation, third party contract enforcement, etc. For a discussion
of the effect of transaction costs in the context of property rights and liability rules, see
generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
54. See Coase, supra note 50, at 15-19. Coase acknowledges that transaction costs are
positive, but does not attempt to construct a formal theory which accounts for those costs.
55. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676,
and of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017642 (1988)) (because costs associated with determining the source of airborne pollutants
would be tremendous, government regulates air pollution at the source).
56. See, e.g., id.
57. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)).
58. See Macey, supra note 23, at 229-33. Rent-seeking behavior occurs when groups use
the political process to redistribute wealth in their favor.
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involve tremendous transaction CoStS. 59 Further, because there is no
guarantee that the legislative outcome will express the preferences of the
affected parties accurately, the regulations may distort the economic
incentives. By and large, the legislative process spreads the costs
associated with the regulatory model among the general populace.
Generally, taxpayers pay the costs of formulating, enacting and enforcing
environmental legislation; yet the benefits from the legislation accrue to
distinct individual parties. For example, all taxpayers contribute to the
financial cost of maintaining national parks, but only a fraction of those
taxpayers visit the parks. In private bargains, the interested parties must
pay the costs of regulation.
C. Defining and Defending PropertyRights
Once government clearly defines private property rights, the
transaction cost problem diminishes substantially. Once private actors
know the nature and extent of their rights, they may easily assign value to
those rights.' Owners of environmental resources can easily recognize
a property encroachment if they have a clear sense of what constitutes a
valid claim. For example, if owners of wetland areas had no extraordinary
restrictions on the disposition of their land, then free market participants
could determine the relative value of preservation or conversion.
Assured that she has enforceable property rights, a property owner
could bargain effectively with others. Other parties, also, could determine
the extent of the property owner's rights and structure their bargains
accordingly. The government's creation of "bright line" rights, such as the
right of forest owners to all wild animals within that forest, greatly lowers
the transaction costs associated with environmental resource exchanges. 1
In the case of community owned environmental resources the
government should require that the polluters compensate the community
for the actual damage to those resources. The state should defend
vigorously the value of community resources, but take care not to
overvalue those resources. Just as a private property owner will sell her
property rights at some value higher than her personal valuation, the state

59. See Bruce Yandle, Escaping EnvironmentalFeudalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
517, 520-25 (1992) (arguing that the transaction costs of legislation may exceed the
transaction costs of private enforcement of property rights even in cases of numerous
potential plaintiffs).
60. See ANDERSON & LEAL,

61. Id.

supra note 22, at 22.
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should sell community resources at their fair market value, which is
whatever the highest bidder is willing to pay. Otherwise, the community
has not maximized the value of its resources. 62

D. Making Polluters Pay, But Not Too Much
Polluters should compensate individuals and property owners for
violations of property rights. Government programs which allow polluters
to damage individual health and diminish the value of property effectively
force injured parties to subsidize the activities of polluters.63 In an
efficient market, industrial polluters pass the subsidy on to consumers of
their products. Because the prices of such goods fail to reflect the actual
cost of production, consumers may have less incentive to replace those
goods with more efficiently made goods than they would in an efficient
market;
Although polluters should pay the true costs of pollution,
government should not enact overly punitive environmental legislation.
The standard for punitive measures should be whether the polluter
intentionally attempted to conceal the pollution or its effects.6 If the
government cannot prove that the polluter attempted to conceal the harm,

62. As in the case of overvalued private property (see supra note 47), overvalued
community property harms society as a whole. For example, suppose a community would
accept compensation at the rate of $100 per gallon for oil spills into a common waterway.
Suppose also that a company normally discharges one gallon per month. Assume that for
$150 per month the company could rent a machine which would guarantee no discharges.
The efficient course of action for the company would be to forego renting the machine
and compensate the community instead. The community is no worse off and the company
avoids the extra fifty dollars per month cost.
Now, suppose the government enacts a law which penalizes polluters at a rate
of $200 per gallon. With the law in effect, the company will purchase the machine for
$150. The community's wealth does not change after the enactment of the law. It has
a clean waterway, but not the $100 per month. The company has an additional fifty
dollars per month expenditure, but no increased product (except one more gallon of oil
per month). The community's wealth remains constant and the company's productivity
declines. The company's sales also decline because its product prices rise to reflect the
increased operating costs.
63. See supra note 43.
64. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1988) (providing for heightened penalties for
failure to comply with the reporting requirement of section 311 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act).
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then the polluter should have to provide compensation only to the injured
party as well as transaction costs, such as administrative or court costs and
legal fees. The injured party will be made whole and the polluter's
product will reflect the actual cost of production.
When the government punishes a party for ordinary pollution,
rather than requiring the party to indemnify victims, the polluter spends
more on pollution prevention than necessary. Punitive measures artificially
inflate the cost of pollution.65 This increase, in turn, unnaturally raises
the cost of goods produced through pollution creating processes. The
relative value of goods produced through non-pollution-creating processes
artificially increases. Consumers suffer because the excessive pollution tax
actually frustrates their free market preference.66
E. Distributingthe Benefits
The free market distributes benefits equitably among all market
participants, but the regulatory model directs excess benefits to some
parties and imposes costs on other parties. In a free market without
transactions costs, no party will exchange a valuable resource for a good
of lesser value. In order for a transaction to occur, both parties must
perceive the other's good as more valuable than his own. For example, a
train company will purchase a farmer's land only if the cost of the
purchase is less than the best alternative. The farmer, in turn, will sell his
land only if the train company's offer exceeds his own valuation of the
same property. If both conditions are met, a transaction will occur and
both parties will benefit.
The regulatory model encourages rent-seeking behavior and
redistributes wealth among interest groups. 67 Instead of paying the true
value of the results which they desire, interested parties spend money
influencing legislation which gives them a benefit in the marketplace."
For example, an environmental group seeking the preservation of a forest

65. See supra note 47.

66. Excessive prevention increases the factor costs of the manufacturer's product.
Presumably, the retail price of the manufacturer's product reflects these increased costs.
Consumers ultimately pay for the productivity loss. Because of the increase in price,

consumers will consume less and substitute more. The price increase effectively frustrates
their free market preference.
67. See Macey, supra note 23.

68. See generally JOHN BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SocIETY (1980) (discussing the public choice theory of legislation).
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owned by a logging company can spend its limited resources on
purchasing the forest or on lobbying the government to restrict logging of
the forest. If the cost of successful lobbying is lower, the group will
choose this course of action. Society as a whole suffers from such
behavior,' the lobbyist, in contrast, benefits in greater proportion than
she would in a free market. Whereas economic actors respond to
economic incentives, politicians respond to political incentives, such as
goodwill among the general population. 70 A lobbying interest with little
money but a popular position may find a responsive legislature. The moral
injustice of redistributionist laws and regulations apparently factors little
into legislative decision-making.
F. Letting the Free Market Regulate
Under the common law, individual property owners bore the
primary responsibility for protecting their property from foreign
72
pollutants. 7' Remedies included injunctive and compensatory relief.
In the modern era, the government has attempted to regulate the
introduction of pollutants into the environment. In many cases government
regulation preempts common law remedies.7 3 As discussed above, the
problem of transaction costs serves as a guiding principle for many
environmental regulatory schemes. This view fails to recognize that the
regulatory model also creates transaction costs and has few safeguards
against the arbitrary redistribution of wealth from the politically weak to
the politically strong.
If we require that polluters compensate resource owners and pay
transaction costs, the free market provides a more equitable distribution of
resources than the regulatory model. For example, if a cement factory
wishes to discharge noxious fumes excessively, it should negotiate a
compensation package with the local community. Depending on the
community's valuation of clean air, the community either refuse to sell its

69. See Macey, supra note 23.
70. See Stroup & Goodman, supra note 33, at 433-35 (arguing that public officials
exhibit bureaucratic "wealth maximizing" behavior).
71. See McRae, supra note 7, at 30-31.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-97 (1987) (holding
that the Clean Water Act (CWA) preempts the common law right of a Vermont resident
to halt the pollution of a New York paper company so long as the CWA allows such
pollution).
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right to reasonably clean air at any cost or accept a level of compensation
equal to or greater than its own valuation of clean air. If the law requires
that the polluter bear all the transaction costs, then the community clearly
will gain from a negotiated compensation package.
A similar analysis should apply to groups wishing to preserve
privately owned resources. If a conservation group wants to preserve the
habitat of a particular species of animal, the group can simply pay the
owner to preserve the area. In the case of publicly owned lands, the
environmentalists can outbid the other interested parties, if the preservation
value of that land is greater than the value of the alternatives.,
Property owners can bring suit against polluters and demand both
compensation for the damage and transaction costs (e.g., the costs of
bringing the suit and determining the extent of the harm). Polluters then
will continue to pollute only if the economic benefits exceed the costs.7 4
If the economic benefits outweigh the cost of compensation and the
polluter, therefore, continues to pollute, society benefits more than it does
when the government mandates an end to pollution." 5 The polluter makes
the injured party whole and still increases its own wealth.
In all of these examples the parties arrive naturally at the most
efficient outcome. An actor who bears the full cost of her pollution will
pollute only if the benefits outweigh the cost of compensation. An
organization interested in the preservation of some privately owned
resource, such as a wetland habitat, can purchase the preservation rights
of that property only if it values that property more than the present owner
does. The parties can determine among themselves who will bear the
transaction costs. Only truly efficient transactions will occur, because the
market participants will make rational economic decisions which accurately
value the resources involved.
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE OIL SHEEN TEST OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL Acr
This section provides a case study in inefficient, absolutist
legislation, as well as some minor market-oriented suggestions for
improvement.
A. The Oil Sheen Test

74. See supra note 46.
75. See supra note 47.
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Section 311(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)"6 prohibits discharges of oil into navigable waters "in
77
quantities as may be harmful as determined by the President."
Executive Order No. 11,548 delegated the defining of "harmful quantities"
to the Secretary of the Interior.7 8 The resulting policy dictates that at all
times and locations and under all circumstances and conditions, discharges
of oil that cause "a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of
the water or adjoining shorelines or cause a sludge or emulsion to be
deposited beneath the surface of the water or adjoining shorelines" are
harmful.79
The law applies to all sources except a "properly functioning vessel
'
engine. 's The law applies to discharges from private vessels,"' onshore
facilities,82 and offshore facilities,83 but exempts public vessels.4 If
the polluter discharges oil in a quantity substantial enough to create a
visible sheen, the owner must inform the Coast Guard.85 The Coast
Guard dispatches a crew to the site of the discharge, inspects and measures
the sheen, and eventually levies a fine of up to $5,000 per discharge on the
polluter.86
Even in cases in which the spill is de minimis, the fine may reach
$5,000.87 The Coast Guard need not prove that the discharge resulted in

76. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988).
78. Exec. Order No. 11,548, 3 C.F.R. § 539 (1972-1976).
79. EPA Discharge of Oil, 40 C.F.R. § 110 (1983).
80. § 110.6.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(3) (1988).
82. § 1321(a)(10).
83. § 1321(a)(11).
84. See Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 549 F. Supp. 233, 236 (D. Or.
1982).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1988).
86. § 1321(b)(6)(A).
87. See Orgulf Transport Co. v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Ky. 1989)
The court in Orgulf reasoned:
Whether a spill resulted in actual harm to the environment is irrelevant
to the determination of whether Section 31 I's prohibition of discharges
of oil in quantities which may be harmful has been violated. The only
pertinent inquiry is whether the spill was in a quantity which may be
harmful as determined by the EPA. Because EPA has determined that
a spill of oil which creates a sheen is a quantity which "may be
harmful," such a spill is subject to the penalty provisions of 33 U.S.C.
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any actual harm to the environment, but merely that the oil created a
visible sheen."8 The polluter has a right to an administrative hearing to
contest the fine,89 but the submission of evidence of even a nominal
environmental harm results in denial of relief.90
In the early years of the oil sheen test, some courts recognized a
9
If a
rebuttable presumption that the spill harmed the-environment.
polluter demonstrated that the spill created no harm, then the court waived
the penalty. 92 In recent years, however, courts have held that the law
93
does not grant an exemption simply because the spill caused no harm.
The Coast Guard need merely determine that the polluter discharged the
oil. 94 Regardless of the actual harm which the spill poses, the Coast
Guard may impose a fine up to $5,000. 95 In determining an appropriate
fine, the Coast Guard must consider the following factors: (1) the size of
the business of the owner or operator charged; (2) the effect on the
polluter's ability to remain commercially viable; and (3) the gravity of the
violation." The Coast Guard deposits the money with the Department
of the Treasury. 7
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Yost,9" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether section 311
allows the Coast Guard to fine an oil company for accidental discharges
of small quantities of oil which caused no actual damage to the
environment. On twelve separate occasions Chevron discharged oil and

§ 1321 and 40 C.F.R. Part 110.3.

Id.
88. Id.

89. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A) (1988).
90. Orgulf, 711 F. Supp. at 347.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1973).
92. Id.
93. Orgulf, 711 F. Supp. at 347. See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Yost, 919 F.2d 27
(5th Cir. 1990).
94. Orgulf, 711 F. Supp. at 347.
95. Id.
96. 33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(5)(A). The fact that the amount of the fine is related to the
financial resources of the polluter apparently mandates disparate treatment of parties who
pollute in identical amounts.

97. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A). The Treasury deposits all fines collected under the
statute with the Oil Pollution Trust Fund. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(b)(4).
98. 919 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1990) (Chevron II).
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notified the Coast Guard promptly thereafter." Chevron requested a
hearing for each of the spills and at each hearing sought to prove at each
hearing that the quantity of oil discharged posed a de minimis impact on
the e.;osystem, despite the visible sheen."U°
Despite Chevron's
evidence,"0 the hearing officer assessed fines ranging from $250 to
$1000 for each incident.'2 The penalty from all twelve discharges
totaled $8,800.13
Chevron successfully appealed the hearing officer's ruling to
federal district court."
Relying on a previous Chevron case,"05 the
district court found that the sheen test constituted a rebuttable presumption
of harm to the environment and accepted Chevron's evidence that the
spills in question posed no environmental harm."°
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
Environmental Protection Agency may levy a fine for the discharge of oil
although the spill results in no actual harm.'°7 The court reasoned that
"the agency may proscribe incipient injury and measure its presence by a
test that avoids elaborated inquiry." '
Addressing the shortcomings of
the law, the court surmised that "[wihile it is apparent that such an
approach sometimes overregulates, it is equally apparent that this
imprecision is a trade-off for the administrative burden of case-by-case
proceedings.""
B. Analysis of the Oil Sheen Test
The court admits in Chevron II, in effect, that the law may require
Chevron to pay the fine although no actual damage occurred, because the
luxury of case-by-case review mandates such an outcome. 0 The costs
associated with case-by-case review fall squarely within the category of
transaction costs. The implication of the court's reasoning is that because

99. Id. at 28.
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id. Chevron's experts testified at each hearing.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. United States v. Chevron Oil Co., 583 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978) (Chevron I).
106. Chevron H, 919 F.2d at 29.
107. Id. at 31.

108. Id. at 30.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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the government must bear these transaction costs, overregulation (i.e.,
excessive penalization) becomes a necessary evil. The government
minimizes the transaction costs if it requires only proof of a visible sheen;
the procedure to check for a sheen requires merely a personal inspection
rather than more costly methods of analysis.
Undoubtedly, this regulatory scheme allows the government to
conserve revenue. Governmental efficiency, however, should not come at
the expense of economic efficiency. The potential polluter will gauge his
preventative measures in accordance with his estimated financial liability.
If financial liability is based on an overly punitive system, the potential
polluter will be inordinately careful."1 Every unit of overinsurance
increases the price of the polluter's product, a cost which the polluter
ultimately passes on to consumers. Because the increased cost stems
directly from the government's efforts to minimize its transaction costs, the
consumers suffer so that the government may benefit.
C. Rewriting the Oil Sheen Legislation
The reinstitution of the rebuttable presumption would benefit the
polluter and, in turn, the consumer. The potential polluter would purchase
the efficient level of prevention. If all transaction costs were shifted to the
polluter, then the entire process would become truly efficient. The Coast
Guard would assess a penalty based solely on its estimation of the gravity
of the harm.
The polluter could contest that finding during an
administrative hearing. The polluter would pay not only for the actual
environmental damage, but also for the cost of the initial inspection and
the costs associated with the hearing. The polluter would contest the
initial Coast Guard finding only if the potential benefits from the
proceeding outweighed its cost. In other words, the polluter would contest
the fine only if the initial levy exceeded the cost of the actual harm plus
the government's administrative costs. As a result, the polluter would
pollute only when economic efficiency required. Society as a whole would
benefit because the gains from pollution would outweigh the actual harm
and transaction costs.
If the polluter causes actual harm to the waterway, the money

111. See supra note 47. The potential polluter will prevent spills to the point that the
marginal cost of an additional unit of prevention costs more than the marginal benefit
achieved from such prevention. The punitive regulation arbitrarily increases the marginal
benefit of each unit of prevention, thus causing the potential polluter to overinsure against
accidental discharge.
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which he pays in compensation should go to the localities that the
pollution effects. The localities can use the money either to clean up the
spill or for some unrelated purpose. In any case, riparian landowners
should receive compensation for any actual damage to their property.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has shown that the government should allow market
participants greater freedom in determining economically efficient levels
of pollution. Generally, Americans trust the free market to provide in an
efficient manner the goods which we consume and desire. Americans
should view the environment as they view other resources. They should
be willing to accept some level of environmental deprivation in exchange
for goods which they consume. The contentious issue is who should
decide the appropriate levels of preservation and depravation. If those
seeking to preserve privately owned resources are willing to pay the cost
of preservation, then society as a whole benefits. If the preservation value
exceeds the conversion value, then those who wish to see such resources
preserved should pay the costs of conservation.
By the same token, those who wish to pollute private or community
property should compensate the owners of those resources. Polluters
should not have to pay excessive compensation, however. Penalizing
polluters who have not attempted to conceal their harmful actions
encourages over-insurance and inefficiency. Environmental laws should
require that polluters pay for the actual harm which they cause as well as
all related transaction costs. Such laws should not overregulate potential
polluters or overvalue environmental resources. The cost of such laws is
inefficiency and an artificial redistribution of wealth among competing
interest groups.

